A major issue in Chapter 21 surrounds the determination of whether a case falls within UCC Article 2. First, think about about the type of item...

Article 2 of the UCC was intended to refer to goods—“all things that are movable at the time of identification to a contract for sale.” It does not provide any direct advice concerning mixed goods and service contracts, where services are “intangible commodit[ies] in the form of human effort, such as labor, skill, or advice.” As such, suppliers of mixed goods and services often argue that Article 2 does not apply by declaring that they have...

Article 2 of the UCC was intended to refer to goods—“all things that are movable at the time of identification to a contract for sale.” It does not provide any direct advice concerning mixed goods and service contracts, where services are “intangible commodit[ies] in the form of human effort, such as labor, skill, or advice.” As such, suppliers of mixed goods and services often argue that Article 2 does not apply by declaring that they have provided a service only. 

In this case, the contract was evidently for a mixture of goods and services. The dentist's work in assessing Mrs. Downing's mouth and then fitting the dentures constituted a service. However, it is stated that he manufactured the dentures himself; thus, he is responsible for creating an inappropriate good: the dentures were "movable at the time of identification to a contract for sale." Unfortunately for Mrs Downing, this does not mean she is entitled to claim under Article 2. 

A number of courts have considered whether mixed contracts contain "implied warranties." The dentist here is arguing that they do not: he suggests that because the contract was not purely one in goods, common law, rather than UCC, must apply. It can be argued that this interpretation is a form of deception—the seller (the dentist) did not stipulate outright at the point of sale that an implied warranty did not exist here. However, it is usually only if the seller can be proven to have used this deception—failure to declare the non-application of an implied warranty—repeatedly that a court would rule in favor of Mrs. Downing. Because there was no warranty specifically agreed on at the point of sale, Mrs. Downing cannot sue for breach of warranty in this case.